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Abstract 
Growing shares of health care sectors in national income in the OECD countries have been 
observed for decades. Rising demand for health care coupled with medical advances may 
generate a significant burden on public finance in the ageing Europe in the coming years. 
We explore European public health care systems from the perspective of intergeneration-
al solidarity using the generational accounting method. The following countries have been 
selected as representatives of the European health care systems: the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We conclude 
that if the growth of demand for health care is to be satisfied and the ratio of taxation 
remains constant, significant debts in health care will be generated by the current gen-
eration. A worse situation was found in systems financed mainly through health insurance 
or income taxes and in countries with high current expenditure on health. 
1. Introduction 
Public expenditure on health reached 6.4% of GDP, or approximately 72% of 
overall expenditure on health, on average in the OECD countries in 2007 (OECD, 
2009b). This is 1.4 percentage points higher than in 1990 and comprises more than 
15% of total public sector expenditure. Medical advances enabled by technological 
progress coupled with growing expectations of individuals concerning health care are 
important drivers of the growth of health expenditure. Additionally, ageing of the Euro-
pean population, characterized by falling fertility rates and increasing life expect-
ancy, may contribute to the process in the future, as numerous long-term projections 
of health expenditure suggest (European Commission, 2009a; OECD, 2006). 
As Ginsburg (2008) summarizes, the growth of the share of health care sectors 
in GDP observed in the past may result from several factors. In particular, techno-
logical progress – bringing either better but more costly methods, or even cheaper 
methods but enabling larger use of health care – seems to have been the major driver 
of health expenditure growth in the past.
1 The impact of ageing on health expenditure 
has been minor so far, but it may foster growth of demand for health care in the fu-
ture, as demographic change seems to be inevitable in developed countries. The other 
drivers of health expenditure worth mentioning include the income elasticity of health 
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care and the Baumol effect, which results from different labor productivity growth 
across sectors amid almost identical wage growth (see Pomp and Vujic, 2008). 
The current health care financing systems in Europe, which draw most re-
sources from the working population, generate unequal distribution of taxes paid to 
finance health care and care received over an individual’s lifespan, as health care needs 
are concentrated in old age. Such a lifetime distribution of taxes and benefits is in 
accordance with the life cycle hypothesis. However, in the context of population age-
ing combined with the kind of pay-as-you-go schemes used to finance health care, 
intergenerational solidarity is likely to be harmed. Given the ever-increasing health ex-
penditure, the question of intergenerational equity is becoming a major topic of the day.  
The main task of this article is to show the growing burden of selected Euro-
pean health care systems on public finance as well as to demonstrate the lifetime dis-
tribution of payments between government and individuals. We use the generational 
accounting method, which allows us to quantify the  size of the notional  burden 
generated by each individual in health care during his life. The Czech Republic, Den-
mark, Estonia, France, Italy, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom were selected 
as being representative of different cultural and institutional settings of the European 
health care systems. 
The article is structured as follows. First, we introduce the method of genera-
tional accounting, including some of its limitations. We then give a  detailed de-
scription of the long-term projection technique, together with descriptive statistics of 
the main variables. This part is divided into sections according to macroeconomic 
fields. The third section then summarizes the results, and the conclusion discusses 
the implications for policy-makers. 
2. Methodology 
The model we use to assess public health care sector sustainability is based on 
generational accounting. First of all we would like to point out that all calculations in 
the model are based on demographic and macroeconomic projections, which more or 
less might predetermine the results. Estimates of the future path of variables, such  
as participation and unemployment rates, labor productivity growth, life expectancy, 
and mortality and total fertility rates, play an important role in the correctly cali-
brated model and its output. One should bear in mind that studies of this kind do not 
produce an accurate forecast of the future. Rather, they present the possible path 
stemming from the trend evolution of the projected variables and their mutual re-
lationships. In addition, they are based on a “no-policy-change scenario”, which means 
that no future corrections and changes, for example, to tax bases, tax rates, and trans-
fer policies, or any other policy measures, are taken into account, i.e., they are based 
on the status quo. 
2.1 Generational Accounting 
The generational accounting method, originally developed by Auerbach et al. 
(1991), was designed to evaluate and compare the burdens of current and future gen-
erations stemming from recent government policy and provides a useful tool for pub-
lic finance sustainability assessment. The main idea behind the concept is the fact 
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during his life. In the life cycle hypothesis, the various burdens and transfers arising 
out of the government sector are age and gender specific. For example, personal in-
come taxes are, in a simplified way, paid only when an individual is working. More-
over, the amount of tax collected differs according to the amount of the wage. Young 
and elderly people are assumed not to pay these taxes. Alternatively, the higher life ex-
pectancy of women implies that old-age pensions will be paid to women for a longer 
time than to men. Nonetheless, the average old-age pension paid to men is supposed 
to be higher due to the higher levels of their previously earned wages. In the health 
care sector the situation is in many aspects similar. Retirees, who pay only consump-
tion taxes, are at major risk to a range of illnesses and health difficulties, whereas 
people of working age bear the most costs connected with health care. 
Broadly speaking, “generational accounts indicate, in present value, what the typ-
ical member of each generation can expect to pay, now and in the future, in net taxes 
(taxes paid net of transfers received)” (Auerbach et al., 1994, p. 75). Considering 
the age dependency, generational accounting takes into account the age profile of 
an average person, presenting “whether the tax and transfer-policy of a selected base- 
-year can be maintained into the indefinite future or whether sooner or later adjust-
ments will be necessary in order to meet the  government’s intertemporal budget 
constraint” (European Commission, 1999, p. 1). 
Generational accounting proceeds from the government intertemporal budget 
constraint, which compares the present values of the net tax payments of existing and 
future generations together with the present value of total future government con-
sumption and government net wealth. More precisely, the intertemporal budget con-
straint can be written as follows:
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payments to the government made in year x by a representative agent born in year k, 
and  , x k P  expresses the number of living cohort members in year  x born in year k. 
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Generational accounting is probably the most suitable instrument for assessing 
intertemporal imbalances in public finance facing demographic changes. It indicates 
how today’s political decisions affect future inter- and intra- generational redistribu-
tion (Bonin and Patxot, 2004). In comparison with other forward-looking approaches 
to fiscal sustainability, such as long-term projections and synthetic indicators, gen-
erational accounts “do not only signal sustainability problems but also clearly show 
their potential implications in terms of intergenerational fairness” (Langenus, 2006, 
p. 7). The calculations are thus made for every age and gender cohort instead of for 
every year. Notwithstanding its significant contributions, this method also has some 
limitations, which we briefly discuss next. 
We have already mentioned that generational accounting, just like all other 
model approaches, simplifies the reality and projects current trends into the future. 
Generational accounting is fairly data demanding, as it takes the whole life cycle of 
the generations into account. Therefore, the approach requires us to focus on long- 
-term projections. 
Some benefits or taxes cannot be simply assigned to a specific age and gender. 
Capital income taxes represent one example. A variety of studies presume that capital 
income taxes are treated in the same way as personal income tax (Cardarelli et al., 
2000; van Ewijk et al., 2002; Gál et al., 2005; Dybczak, 2006). In other words, they 
assume these types of taxes can be divided according to the nominal wage, thus they 
are fully borne by employees. This would cause a constant labor-to-GDP ratio if 
the nominal average wage was driven by labor productivity growth. Nonetheless, 
there are some circumstances, which complicate this decision, since capital taxes 
may be partly included in the price of current or old assets and tax payments may dif-
fer from the income on assets. In addition, the tax incidence view of both the theo-
retical and empirical literature is not unambiguous. Other unattributed elements are 
dealt with in section 2.6 “Revenue Projection.” 
Another particularity of generational accounting is the measurement of govern-
ment net wealth, usually defined as the value of government assets less government 
gross debt (liabilities). The former, however, is not easy to estimate (see European 
Commission, 1999, pp. 23–24). The problem of measuring government assets is typi-
cally overcome by adopting the assumption that net wealth is identical to net public 
debt – gross public debt net of present or expected privatization revenues. In our case 
there is no need to express government net wealth since we do not use all the net 
payments to government, just those that are health care related.
3  
Net tax payments and government wealth are calculated in present values. For 
that reason one must choose an appropriate discount rate, or rather discount rate path. 
There is a consensus among papers that the discount rate is constant over the proj-
ected span, and it is set somewhere between the government bond long-term interest 
rate and private sector capital returns. Typically, analyses of sensitivity to different 
discount rates are made. 
Last but not least, the  System of National Accounts distinguishes between 
individual and collective consumption, such as research and development, safety and 
order, and national defense, which are not included in individual transfers from gov- 
 
3 We deal with these issues in more detail in sections “2.5 Expenditure Projection” and “2.6 Revenue
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Table 1  Assumptions for Eurostat’s EuroPop 2008 Demographic Projection 
(situation in 2060) 





Czech  Republic  1.52 83.2 87.8  13.0 
Denmark  1.85 84.3 88.4 6.5 
Estonia  1.66 80.8 87.5 -0.1 
France  1.93 85.1 90.1 6.0 
Italy  1.55 85.5 90.0  19.9 
Netherlands  1.77 84.9 88.9 3.0 
United  Kingdom  1.84 85.0 88.9  10.1 
Note: 
a Annual net migration. 
Source: Eurostat (2008a). 
 
Table 2  Economic Dependency Ratios (in %, p.p., 2009–2110) 




Czech  Republic  41.3 42.1 57.0 88.4 89.0  47.2  0.6 
Denmark  53.6 53.3 68.0 74.1 80.8  20.6  6.7 
Estonia  47.4 47.7 60.1 82.8 90.1  35.4  7.3 
France  53.4 53.6 69.9 77.6 82.9  24.3  5.3 
Italy  51.6 51.8 64.0 84.9 87.3  33.3  2.4 
Netherlands  47.9 48.2 67.9 76.7 83.6  28.9  6.9 
United  Kingdom  50.6 51.0 64.5 76.5 78.3  25.9  1.8 
Notes: The economic dependency ratio is calculated as the ratio of the number of people aged 0–14 and 65 
and older to those of working age (15–64). Since Eurostat’s projection is always dated to January 1, 
annual averages are presented in the table. The ratios in 2010 are based on the Labor Force Survey 
population structure from Q1–Q3 2010. 
Sources: For 2009 and 2010, Eurostat (2010). For 2011–2060, Eurostat (2008a). Beyond 2060, authors’ cal-
culations. 
 
ernment. Thus, the generational accounts do not give a full picture of the benefits that 
a recipient receives from the government sector, mainly because of problems with 
the allocation of collective consumption. 
Having given an overview of generational accounting together with its main 
drawbacks, we turn now to the projection model so that we can calculate all the vari-
ables needed for the purposes of generational accounting in public health care sys-
tems. 
2.2 Demography 
The overall “exercise” starts with a demographic projection, in our case based 
on Eurostat’s EuroPop 2008 migration convergence scenario. The projection assumes 
that the socio-economic and cultural differences between the EU Member States will 
fade out in the very long run, on account of which the year of convergence of demo-
graphic values was set to 2150 (see Table 1 for Eurostat’s assumptions). In Table 1 it 
is worth noting that the fertility rates are below the natural population replacement 
rates required to maintain the population at the current level.  
Additionally, for the purposes of generational accounting we had to prolong 
the demographic projection to 2110, while maintaining EuroPop’s assumptions. Ta-
ble 2 gives a simple data description where economic, i.e., young and old-age, de- 
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Table 3  Non-Accelerating Wage Rate of Unemployment (in %, 2000–2110) 
Country  2000 2005 2008 2009 2010 2011 2015  2020– 
–2110 
Czech  Republic    7.1 7.1 6.4 6.4 6.6 7.0 6.7 6.4 
Denmark    5.1 4.5 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.2 
Estonia    10.8 8.3 8.4 9.8  11.7  13.8  11.1 8.4 
France    9.6 9.1 8.9 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 8.9 
Italy    9.0 8.4 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.8 7.9 7.9 
Netherlands   3.2 3.1 3.4 3.7 4.3 4.6 4.1 3.4 
United  Kingdom  5.7 5.1 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.4 6.8 6.1 
Sources: For 2000–2011, European Commission (2010). For 2012 and beyond, authors’ assumptions. 
 
pendency ratios are displayed. The economic dependency ratio reflects the decreas-
ing share and ageing of the working-age population. From the current level, ranging 
between 41.2% in the Czech Republic to 53.5% in Denmark, the dependency ratio is 
supposed to change dramatically. High increases in the Czech Republic (by 47.2 p.p. 
to 88.4% in 2060), Estonia (by 35.4 p.p. to 82.8%) and Italy (by 33.3 p.p. to 84.9%) 
anticipate rising ageing. Even though the  figures vary somewhat, each country is 
confronted with a similar problem. 
2.3 Labor Market 
The demographic projection is then used to calculate the age and sex-specific 
labor force. We use the European Commission’s participation rate projections, defin-
ed as the ratio of economically active men/women in a given year to the total number 
of men/women of this age: 
                                                    
,, , s xs x s x
tt t EA pr POP =⋅
                                            (2) 
where  , s x
t EA stands for the age (x) and sex (s) specific labor force,  , s x
t pr  corresponds 
to the participation rate in year t, and  , s x
t POP is analogously the age (x) and sex (s) 
specific part of the population. In order to proceed further we had to decompose 
the labor force into employment and unemployment. 
Several assumptions concerning employment and unemployment had to be 
made. First, we hold constant the share of employees and the self-employed over 
the projection span. Second, we do not distinguish between part-time and full-time 
work and all data are taken for or recalculated to the full-time employment equivalent 
in the process. Next, we presume that hours worked and the full-time and part-time 
ratios do not change. And finally, the European Commission’s (2010) Non-Acceler-
ating Wage Rate of Unemployment (NAWRU) values were considered as a proxy for 
structural unemployment rates (Carone, 2005). Current unemployment rates con-
verge to these structural levels in the medium term, with the speed of convergence 
derived from the historical trends of unemployment rates. The past and future esti-
mated NAWRU values are summarized in Table 3.  
The economic crisis in 2008/2009 hit the labor markets as well. However, we 
presume the crisis will not change the structural characteristics of the selected econo-
mies, so we take the assumption that NAWRU will reach the 2008 values sooner or 
later, depending on the difference between the 2011 level and the 2008 level, but not 
later than in 2020.
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Table 4  Labor Productivity Growth – Baseline Scenario (in %, 2008–2110) 
Country  2008 2009 2010 2011 2020 2030  2050–2110 
Czech  Republic  0.9  -2.8 2.2 2.0 2.0 1.9  1.7 
Denmark  -2.0  -1.9 3.7 1.9 2.4 2.1  1.7 
Estonia  -3.7  -5.1 2.4 2.6 2.3 2.1  1.7 
France  -0.1  -0.4 2.1 1.1 1.6 1.6  1.7 
Italy  -0.9  -2.1 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.3  1.7 
Netherlands  0.8  -4.4 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.0  1.7 
United  Kingdom  -0.2  -2.6 1.8 0.5 1.1 1.3  1.7 
Sources: For 2000–2011, European Commission (2010). For 2050, European Commission (2008). Authors’ 
calculations. 
 
In order to preserve the NAWRU values over time, the age and sex-specific 
unemployment rates were derived as follows (European Commission, 2008b, p. 79): 

























                              (3) 
where  ,
2008
s x un  is the fixed unemployment rate for age x and sex s in year 2008 and 
, s x
t un  is the desirable sex and age-specific unemployment rate in year t. Therefore, 
the structure of unemployment in 2008 is kept constant. The age and sex-specific em-
ployment rate is then easily the product of the sex and age-specific participation rate, 
one minus the unemployment rate, and the number of persons in the age-sex cate-
gory: 
                                             ( )
,, , , 1 s xs x s x s x
tt t t L pr un POP =⋅ − ⋅                                    (4) 
Total employment is calculated as the sum of all of the specific employments. 
2.4 Labor Productivity and Gross Domestic Product 
By multiplying total employment and labor productivity, we are able to com-
pute GDP in real terms. For simplicity, we adopted the EC’s hypothesis about labor 
productivity growth converging to 1.7% in all countries in 2050 (see European Com-
mission, 2008, p. 94). For the short and medium term, we used the EC’s forecast 
(2010) – see Table 4. The economic crisis will probably end up in a permanent loss of 
potential output in terms of level but not in terms of growth (see Box 1) in the long 
run, so we can count on the convergence hypothesis going forward. Therefore, be-
yond the forecast horizon, we apply a simple interpolation with a logarithmic trend. 
To respect possible diverse scenarios, a sensitivity analysis was conducted for dif-
ferent labor productivity growth rates. 
Recapping the formula, GDP growth is determined by the growth of total 
employment and labor productivity, so the model does not assume any changes in 
the capital-labor ratio. Moreover, the evolution of labor productivity determines the pro-
gression of the average real wage, which is essential for labor supply income after-
wards (see below). Nominal GDP is then the product of real GDP and the GDP de- 
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Box 1  Economic Downturns and Long-Term Projections 
In 2008 and at the beginning of 2009 an unprecedented economic recession hit almost every developed 
country. This raises the question of to what extent the downturn might have affected long-term variables  
in terms of both their levels and their growth rates. Even though there is uncertainty about the nature 
and magnitude of the crisis, international think-tanks (European Commission, 2009b; IMF, 2009; OECD, 
2009a) do not predict any durable implications for long-run potential output growth, whereas the level of 
potential output has in all likelihood been reduced. Short and perhaps medium-term potential growth 
will be probably lower, but persistent adverse impacts are dependent on the duration of the recovery 
period and on the policy responses. 
Decomposing potential output as defined by the Cobb-Douglas production function, the problem breaks 
down into three issues: the labor force, the capital stock, and total factor productivity. The labor force might 
be affected by higher structural unemployment generated by the hysteresis effect and lower partici-
pation rates, especially among individuals starting or ending the productive part of their life cycle. How-
ever, participation rates could be strengthened by the activity of second earners entering the labor 
market in times of economic difficulties in order to overcome the loss of income. OECD (2009a) esti-
mates the cumulative effect of labor not to be of a long-term nature, with only a slight effect on potential 
output. Secondly, the reduced capital stock is assumed to have the most unfavorable impact on poten-
tial, owing to higher capital costs, which could worsen the capital-to-labor ratio and thus also produc-
tivity over the medium term. Nevertheless, much of this effect has already materialized, as investment 
has fallen sharply during the economic downturn. The role and the result of the behavior of the last 
component, total factor productivity, are ambiguous. The main total factor productivity drivers, such as 
research and development, innovation in technologies, and physical investment, fell in the recession 
and are likely to pick up only slowly if the financial and economic conditions remain impaired. Con-
versely, downturns generally serve as a “cleansing medium”, driving resources to the new, most pro-
ductive uses and correcting the misallocation at the peak of the business cycle. And IMF (2009), for 
instance, expects that “the level of total factor productivity recovers somewhat to its precrisis trend over 
the medium term” (p. 122). 
The importance of setting “appropriate” values of the projected variables is underpinned by the fact that 
an overestimated impact of the crisis would accumulate into the future and spoil the results. The need 
to choose a middle or steady state path is satisfied by the nature of the long-term projections, which 
focus primarily on the trend path. 
 
flator, which converges to the  European Central Bank’s inflation target, ensuring 
“inflation rates close to 2% over the medium term” (ECB, 2003). 
2.4.1 Rationalizing Constant Shares of Factors of Production 
Constant ratios of production factors to output are considered in the long term 
over the projection span. The stable shares assumption can be verified directly or de-
rived indirectly via theories of growth models. We would like to point out that the in-
formation provided by all long-term time series of indicators is potentially misleading, 
as their content and definitions may have changed over time. 
As far as the direct approach is concerned, Kaldor (1963) gives six basic “styl-
ized facts” about economic growth, which also involve constant shares of labor and 
physical capital in national income. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003) then provide 
several other studies indicating the factors’ long-term stability. Gollin (2002) revised 
Kaldor’s “fact” and assessed that “factor shares give estimates that are remarkably 
consistent with the claim that factor shares are approximately constant across time 
and space”. Moreover, he suggests using “models that give rise to constant factor 
shares” (p. 15). Gundlach (2007) also asserts that “the cross-country data on output 
per worker can be consistently summarized by a specification that allows for interna-
tional variation in technology conditional on a constant capital output ratio” (p. 17). 386                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 5 
Analogously, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001) find that “the time series of labor 
shares by country tend to be quite stable, with no systematic tendency to rise or fall 
over time” (p. 26). 
Some growth model theories might also support the stable shares hypothesis – 
either those based on the neoclassical Solow growth model (both the basic one and 
the one encompassing Harrod-neutral technical change) or the later Ramsey-Cass- 
-Koopmans model or Diamond’s overlapping generations model. The convergence to 
steady state observed in reality is built into these models. The variables develop at 
constant rates in the steady state and do not change the capital-labor ratio. Later the-
ories coping with endogenous growth of internalized technology can keep the ratio 
constant in the long run, but there are some theories (e.g. the  pure “AK model”) 
where the convergence to steady state is broken and thus the ratio might vary over 
time. 
The empirical verifications of growth models, which should help with selec-
tion of the right model, are rather disputable. Some of them support the claim that 
the Solow model “is consistent with the international evidence if one acknowledges 
the importance of human as well as physical capital” (Mankiw et al., 1992, p. 433). 
Nevertheless, Bernanke and Gurkaynak (2001, p. 1) state that Mankiw et al.’s “basic 
estimation framework is broadly consistent with any growth model that admits a bal-
anced growth path”. Similarly, Gundlach (2007) concedes that his empirical results 
are “in line with the Solow model” (p. 17). Others, such as Okada (2006), conclude 
that the Solow mechanism serves as a good explanation of convergence in developed 
countries such as OECD members, but not if one takes into account less developed 
countries. On the contrary, the study of Arnold et al. (2007) suggests that the “esti-
mated speed of convergence appears to be too high to be consistent with the human- 
-capital-augmented version of the Solow model, but rather support the endogenous 
growth model” (p. 21). 
Moreover, the verifications of the models with human capital seem to be prob-
lematic. Not only are they tremendously data-consuming, but they also often quantify 
qualitative categories to specify human capital, such as level of knowledge, quality of 
health care, education, and social security environment, substituted by questionable 
proxies in econometrical estimates. 
Thus, to analyze developed countries, given convergence of their economies 
and taking into account the standard long-term projection methodology, we decided 
to develop the model on the neoclassical economic framework with constant factor 
shares. 
Having described the major macroeconomic prerequisites, we can continue by 
introducing government health care expenditure and revenue projection techniques. 
2.5 Expenditure Projection 
The basic projection of health care expenditure crucially depends on the health 
care cost profiles. The age and sex-related profiles, expressed in percent of GDP per 
capita, denote average annual health care expenditure.
5 The first step in the projec- 
tion is to smooth multi-year categories to one-year intervals and multiply the average 
5 The age and sex-related health care cost profiles for the selected countries are the same as those used by 
the European Commission’s Ageing Report (European Commission, 2009b). Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 5                                     387 
health care costs for an individual of age x and sex s in the initial year 2008 by 
the  number of individuals of age x and sex s in every year of the  demographic 
projection. The total spending of cohort x and gender s in a particular year can be 
easily described as: 
                                            ,, ,
2008
N






=⋅ ⋅                                          (5) 
where  ,
2008
s x c  are the costs per capita for each sex and age that are given by the initial 
year of the projection, and  , s x
t POP  stands for the number of individuals in the defin-
ed age and sex categories in year t given by the demographic projection. Every expend-
iture profile is then multiplied by GDP per capita to get total nominal expenditure for 
each category. 
The above-described method implies the  “expansion of morbidity” hypo-
thesis, first proposed by Grunenberg in 1977. According to the hypothesis, the num-
ber of years of life spent in good health will remain constant and all additional years 
gained by increases in life expectancy will be spent in impaired health status due to 
chronic illnesses (Parkinson’s disease, arthritis, senile dementia, etc.) and other causes. 
Later on, more optimistic scenarios were proposed in the literature. The “compres-
sion of morbidity” hypothesis, published by Fries (1980), states on the contrary that 
the part of life spent in disease and disability will remain constant and the health 
status of the population will improve, as the time lived in ill health will be com-
pressed with growing longevity. The middle way between the two hypotheses is 
the “dynamic equilibrium”, according to which the proportion of life lived severely 
disabled will remain constant. In order to take into account possible improvements in 
the  health status of the  population we model the  dynamic equilibrium hypothesis. 
Technically, in long-term projection exercises this hypothesis is modeled by shifting 
the age-related health care cost profiles along with the growing life expectancy (Euro-
pean Commission, 2009a, OECD, 2006): 
                                                       
, , Δ ,
2008
s x
t s xe sx
t cc
− =                                                    (6) 
where  , Δ s x
t e  is the change in life expectancy of a given gender s and age x between 
year t and the base year 2008, hence  ,, ,
2008 Δ s xs x s x
tt eee =− . 
Furthermore, there is another important driver of health care expenditure – 
Wagner’s hypothesis of public expenditure growth, characterized here by the income 
elasticity. Although recent econometric studies (Costa-Font et al., 2009; Baltagi and 
Moscone, 2009), contrary to the original literature (Newhouse, 1987; Gerdtham and 
Johnson, 2000), suggest that the income elasticity of health care is lower than 1, a gen-
eral conclusion on income elasticity has not yet been reached (Dybczak and Przywa-
ra, 2010). Nevertheless, a growing share of the health care sector in GDP in relation 
to the level of economic development has been observed in the OECD countries (see 
Figure 1). 
Although the growth may be attributable to technological progress, no simple 
methodology can predict the future evolution of technological change and we are 
thus left with the historical trends. Simplifying the discussion, we assume the income 
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Figure 1  Health Care Expenditures and Economic Development in the OECD Countries  
(2007) 
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Note: In addition, Estonia and Slovenia were included and Luxemburg excluded. 
Sources: OECD (2009a, 2009b). Authors’ calculations. 
 
elasticity of health care expenditure to converge in a linear manner from 1.1 to 1.0 in 
line with the European Commission (2008) reference scenario. The average health 
care costs for gender s and age x in year t are computed by multiplying the average 
costs for the given age and sex category from the previous year by the sum of one 
and the multiple of the elasticity and GDP per capita growth between the two pe-
riods: 
















⎜⎟ =⋅ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
                                    (7) 
where  t ε  represents the income elasticity of 1.1% diminishing linearly to 1.0% in 
2060 and remaining stable thereafter. The final age and gender-specific health care 
expenditures for gender s and age x are obtained by simply substituting equation (6) 
into equation (7), thus the total specific expenditures  , s x
t C can be described as fol-
lows: 
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⎜⎟ =⋅ ⋅ ⋅ + − ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
             (8) 
Unlike in the standard generational accounting method we do not take into 
account any initial debt or surplus of the public health care systems. The choice re-
sults from the  impossibility of measuring the  health care debt in national health 
service systems financed directly from the  general budget. This would end up in 
biased results in comparison with other countries. Moreover, health insurance sys-
tems usually manage resources based on a balanced budget. 
2.6 Revenue Projection 
The financing of public health care systems in Europe differs in terms of 
the mix of taxes used in the selected countries. Generally, two types of health care 
system can be distinguished: systems based on a kind of national health service, 
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Box 2  Financing Public Health Care in the Selected Countries
a  
In the Czech Republic, social health insurance is compulsory and mostly employees, employers, and 
the self-employed pay the contributions. The state contributes to the system on behalf of special groups  
of non-wage earners, such as children, pensioners, parents on maternity leave, the unemployed, and 
asylum seekers. In addition to the state contribution on behalf of non-wage earners, the state finances 
capital investment in the hospitals it manages, training of medical personal, etc. Social security con-
tributions thus cover less than 70% of public health care spending.  
The public health care system in Denmark is financed by general and municipal taxes. Health care in 
the regions, which accounts for most of the health care spending, is financed by four kinds of subsidies: 
a block grant from the state (75%), a state activity-related subsidy (5%), a local basic contribution (10%), 
and a local activity-related contribution (5%). The part coming from the state is financed mainly by 
health contributions, which account for 8% of wages. 
In Estonia, employees and the self-employed pay the social health insurance contributions mostly. 
The state contributes for less than 3% of non-wage earners (individuals on parental leave, the unem-
ployed, people receiving social benefits, and other minor groups). Major groups of non-wage earners 
(pensioners, children, etc.) are covered by social health insurance without contributing themselves and 
without the state contributing for them.  
In France, every working person and his/her dependants belong to a health insurance scheme accord-
ing to occupation.
b The revenues of the health insurance schemes are raised from social health in-
surance contributions paid by employees, employers, and the self-employed, from retirement pensions 
and invalidity and pre-retirement benefits and other replacement income, from investment income and 
property income, and from taxes on car insurance premia, some alcoholic drinks, tobacco, advertising 
for pharmaceuticals and medical products, etc.  
The main source of finance of the Italian national health service is general taxation, but the regions and 
autonomous provinces are entitled to set the level of regional taxes, which account for 40% of public 
health care sector resources. The main regional tax dedicated mostly to health care is the tax on pro-
ductive activities, which is a flat-rate tax on the value added generated by all types of business and 
self-employed activities. The second regional source is a personal income surcharge.  
The Dutch public health care system has two components, the first of which is a statutory health in-
surance system financed by a mixture of social health insurance contributions and nominal premia  
paid by insurees and the second of which, covering long-term care, is the AWBZ (defined under the Ex-
ceptional Medical Expenses Act) raising funds purely from social health insurance contributions. 
The state contributes for the premia of children up to the age of 18 in the first component and a grant  
to the AWBZ.  
In Switzerland, two-thirds of public health expenditure is financed through mandatory health insurance 
purchased on an individual basis. The nominal premia differs across funds and purchased policies and 
are not income-related. Children benefit from lower nominal premia. The remaining one-third of public 
expenditure is financed by the cantons from general taxation and consists mainly of subsidies to insti-
tutional providers (hospitals, nursing homes).  
The United Kingdom’s National Health Service is funded mainly by general taxation (76%), but also by 
national insurance contributions (19%) and user charges (5%). National insurance contributions are paid 
by employers and employees and are counted as general government revenue in the National Health 
Accounts. 
Notes: 
a Based on Zápal et al. (2009). 
                    b In 2001, 84% of the population belonged to the general scheme (Régime Général), which covers 
employees in commerce and industry and CMU beneficiaries (CMU is a subsidiary system which 
provides medical coverage for persons who do not benefit from any other medical coverage 
schemes). 
 
local authorities (Denmark, Italy, and the United Kingdom), and systems of social 
insurance, where the financing of health care is managed by one or more health in-
surance companies (the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, and the Netherlands). 
However, as Box 2 demonstrates, even in the systems based on social insur-
ance, the state often contributes to the system either on behalf of some groups of 
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Table 5  Age Related Taxes Considered in the Model  








added tax  Excises 
Country 
1100 2000 5111 5121 
Total age 
related taxes 
Czech  Republic  11.0 43.8 19.2 10.0 84.0 
Denmark  52.8 2.0  20.9 8.9  84.5 
Estonia  19.1 36.2 25.9 10.5 91.7 
France  17.4 37.2 16.2  5.2 76.0 
Italy  26.8 31.1 13.7  4.6 76.1 
Netherlands
a  20.4 36.2 19.8  8.3 84.7 
United  Kingdom  29.9 19.2 17.8  8.1 75.1 
Notes: Four-digit numbers and the revenue categories refer to the OECD international government revenue 
classification.  
a Figures for the Netherlands in year 2007. 
Sources: OECD (2010). Ministry of Finance of Estonia (2010). Authors’ calculations. 
 
citizens, such as children and pensioners, or directly to some providers, such as pub-
lic-operated hospitals. As the model requires sources of finance to be distinguished 
according to categories of taxes that can be associated with age, we decided to divide 
the public sector contributions in line with the sources of finance of the central bud-
get if there are no special taxes designated for health care. As for government sector 
revenues affiliated with labor income assigned to every age and sex, we de-termined: 
“1100 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains of individuals” and “2000 Social 
security contributions.”
6 The sum of the variety of indirect taxes – “5111 Value ad-
ded taxes” and “5121 Excises” – is supposed to be borne fully by individuals, which 
allows restoration of their age profile. Table 5 reveals the total amount of age-related 
taxes considered in the model. 
Finally, Table 6 gives the structure of all considered revenues of the public 
health care systems in 2007.
7 The logic of the distribution of revenues is as follows. 
First of all, social security contributions, nominal premia, and all taxes specially as-
signed to health care used in the particular system are considered and assigned to 
the age categories. In the second step, the revenues of the public health care system 
financed directly through central or local budgets are assigned to the age categories 
in line with the distribution of the central budget revenues (Table 5). The remaining 
part is considered as “other revenues” and distributed equally to the age categories. 
The structure of financing in 2007 is preserved over time in the projection. 
Modeling labor income taxes first, we apply the effective tax rates of social 
security contributions ( SSC t ) paid by employees, employers, and the self-employed, 
and personal income taxes ( PIT t ) to the tax base in every following year. The aver-
age effective tax rates were calculated as the ratio of the tax part used for health care 
funding to its tax base. The tax base for every age and sex category is equal to 
the product of the number of employed persons in every age and sex category and 
the modeled nominal average wage in the age and gender category. Direct age and 
gender-specific income taxes ( , s x
t DIT ) are thus: 
6 See OECD (2010) for the codes and tax classification. 
7 More up-to-date figures were not available at the time of writing. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 5                                     391 
Table 6  Structure of the Government Sector Sources Financing Acute  
and Long-Term Care (in %, 2007) 










Czech Republic  69.6  -  6.2  15.2  8.9 
Denmark 0.0  -  51.1  31.4  17.5 
Estonia 82.3  -  3.8  6.1  7.8 
France 93.6  -  2.1  2.2  2.1 
Italy 0.1  -  9.6  72.7  17.6 
Netherlands 0.0  31.4  62.0 4.1  2.6 
United Kingdom  0.0  -  35.7  32.4  31.9 
Sources: OECD (2008), OECD (2010). Authors’ calculations. 
 
                                          
,, , , () s x Nsx sx
tP I T S S C t t DIT t t W L =+⋅ ⋅                                  (9) 
The age and sex-specific nominal wage
8 ( ,, Nsx
t W ) is supposed to grow in line 
with the average nominal wage, which rises by the percentage change of labor pro-
ductivity and the GDP deflator, which for the sake of simplicity is taken as the rate  
of growth of the price level. 
The average effective tax rates are at the same time held constant over the proj-
ected period. Whereas indirect taxes are typically assumed to be proportional to their 
tax base (see André and Girouard, 2005; or European Commission, 2005), personal 
income taxes are usually constructed as progressive,
9 i.e., the higher the tax base, 
the higher the rate of the tax (the so-called marginal tax rate). In such a system of 
taxation, increasing the average wage would raise the effective tax rate, which might 
boost the total tax burden and the size of the government sector in the economy in-
definitely. That is why we assume all effective tax rates to be constant in the projec-
tion, rather than using fixed statutory tax rates. A similar problem arises for gradual 
tax progressivity (tax brackets) and taxflation. 
The age distribution of value added tax and excise revenues is calculated from 
the age distribution of consumption as defined by COICOP
10 per adult equivalent. 
The effective tax rates for age categories are applied to the demographic projection, 
whereas the change of the ratio of total consumption to GDP is assumed to be zero. 
Effective consumption tax rates were calculated by dividing the part of value added 
tax and excise revenues that serves for health care financing by the final consumption 
expenditure of households. 
8 The age and gender-specific profile of nominal wages, derived from Eurostat (2006) and national statis-
tical offices, was fixed for the projection analysis. 
9 A statutory flat tax rate does not necessarily mean that the tax is proportional to its base. Flat taxes are 
usually computed as the product of a constant (the statutory tax rate) and the difference between income 
(or another tax object) and a stable deductible item (alternatively there is a deduction from the calculated 
tax). Thus, deductible items/tax deductions imply progressivity of the flat tax, since the higher the value of 
the object of the tax, the higher the relative tax base (see Kim et al., 2006, and Prušvic and Přibyl, 2006,
for details). 
10 COICOP stands for Classification of Individual Consumption According to Purpose. The decomposition 
of individual consumption and assignation of taxes was made on the basis of the following sources: Euro-
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Other revenues, which are not connected with age or sex, are held constant to 
GDP over the projected span as well, proportionally allocated to the total population. 
Thus, we consider them to be a lump sum, proportionally divided per capita: 











=⋅                                           (10) 
where  , s x
t OR  denotes the age and sex-specific unit of the other revenues of the gener-
al government sector,  2008 OR  the total value of other revenues in 2008, and  2008
N GDP  
nominal GDP in the corresponding year. 
We can now assemble the explicitly revealed age and sex general government 
revenues financing health care by simple summation of all three components: 
                                            ,, , , s xs x s x s x
tt t t T DIT IT OR =+ +                                       (11) 
where  , s x
t IT  stands for the product of the age and gender-specific effective indirect 
tax rate in year t and age and gender-specific household consumption at the same 
time. 
2.7 Generational Accounts in Health Care 
Finally, the total generational account of the selected cohort, which expresses 
in present value the  total burden (if the  outcome is negative) for public finance 
generated by a representative agent during his life in health care, may be expressed as 
follows: 


















=− ⋅ ⋅ + ∑∑
∑
                     (12) 
We have already noted that to apply sensitivity analysis to diverse discount 
rates is necessary for the model, as changes in the rates might have significant effects 
on the results. Specifying an interest rate that can be used for the discounting proce-
dure is not a straightforward task. Therefore, we follow the standard recommendation 
and select the “Maastricht criterion bond yields”, which represent long-term interest 
rates and form part of the convergence criteria for euro area accession. The 10-year 
average of this type of interest rate was 5% in the EU-27 in 2000–2009, whereas in 
the countries we deal with in this paper it was 0.2 p.p. lower. Our analysis of the re-
sults of the generational accounts is based on a 5% discount rate with 1 p.p. distinct 
values in both directions. 
In the results, we also use summation of all cohort-specific health expendi-
tures and revenues, which generally gives total health expenditures and revenues, 
respectively, in a given year. 
3. Results 
Given the assumptions we adopted concerning the evolution of future health 
expenditures and revenues, the model suggests important fiscal imbalances in the fu-
ture in all analyzed countries. On average, the share of health expenditure in GDP 
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Table 7  Health Care Expenditures and Deficits (in % of GDP, 2007–2107) 
Expenditures Deficits 
Country 
2007 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2107 2060 2107 
Czech  Republic  6.3 6.6 6.9  7.2 7.4 7.5 7.5  0.9 1.2 
Denmark  7.7 8.0 8.4  8.8 9.0 9.1 9.2  1.1 1.5 
Estonia  5.1 5.3 5.6  5.8 6.0 6.1 6.1  0.7 1.0 
France  8.8  9.1  9.6  10.0 10.3 10.4 10.4 1.2  1.6 
Italy  6.9 7.2 7.5  7.8 8.0 8.1 8.1  0.9 1.2 
Netherlands  7.6 7.9 8.3  8.7 8.9 9.0 9.0  1.1 1.4 
United  Kingdom  7.2 7.4 7.8  8.1 8.3 8.4 8.4  0.9 1.2 
Note: As at the beginning all systems were made balanced and the revenues are kept constant in relation to 
GDP, the revenue ratio equals the expenditure ratio in 2007. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Table 8  Generational Accounts According to the Discount Rate  
(in % of GDP per capita) 
 Discount  rate 
Country  4.0 5.0  (baseline) 6.0 
Czech Republic  -118.6  -80.0  -66.7 
Denmark -124.0  -82.9  -68.6 
Estonia -90.7  -53.0  -41.0 
France -163.8  -101.6  -82.8 
Italy -87.9  -72.3  -65.1 
Netherlands -126.8  -87.3  -74.3 
United Kingdom  -93.0  -65.7  -55.0 
Note: Labor productivity growth in the long term was set to 1.7%. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
would grow by 18%, i.e., by 1.3 p.p. of GDP. The assumption of constant factor 
shares coupled with a constant consumption-to-GDP ratio implies a constant reve-
nues-to-GDP ratio. All the growth of the ratio of health expenditure to GDP thus 
creates the growth of the notional deficit. The growth of health expenditure is sum-
marized in Table 7.  
The generational accounts of the current generation show important burdens 
generated by the individual during his/her life. The size of the burden for various 
discount rates is shown in Table 8 (the total generational accounts are expressed in 
GDP per capita for better comparability between the analyzed countries). The aver-
age burden in present value that a 2007 newborn generates in health care during his 
life equals 78% of GDP per capita in the analyzed countries if the 5% baseline dis-
count rate is taken into account. The highest burden was found in France, where  
it reaches the value of GDP per capita (102%). At the other end of the spectrum, 
the lowest burden (almost half) was found in Estonia (53%). 
The size of the burden results from several factors. First of all, the initial size 
of the health expenditure plays an important role in the final generational account. 
The higher the discount rate, the more pronounced the effect of the original health 
expenditure. However, the mix of taxes used to finance health care plays a signifi-
cant role as well. In general, the more income taxes are used to finance health care, 
the higher is the burden generated by a newly born individual. We observe that 
the generational accounts in Italy and the United Kingdom, where consumption taxes 
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Figure 2  Generational Accounts for a 2007’s Newborn in the Selected EU Health 
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Notes: Years of age are depicted on the horizontal axes; on vertical ones, the % of GDP per capita. Labour 
productivity growths at 1.7%.  
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
play an important role in financing health care, are below those of the Czech Repub-
lic, where health care is financed mainly through social health insurance contribu-
tions, although health expenditure is higher in both countries.  
Comparing the different systems of financing health care, higher burdens on 
future generations are generated by social health insurance systems (France, the Neth-
erlands, and the Czech Republic) and lower burdens are generated by national health 
service systems (Italy and the United Kingdom), on condition that low initial health 
expenditure does not reverse the results as we observe in Estonia. The Danish nation-
al health system is another exception, as special taxes on income are assigned to fi-
nance health care. The  differences between the  financing systems in the  selected 
countries are clearly visible in the shape of the generational accounts (see Figure 2). 
Whereas in France, where revenues are raised almost entirely from the working popu-
lation, the shape of the generational account is highly humpy, in Italy it is rather flat. 
However, no general conclusion can be made from this finding, as the model does 
not take into account the specifics of the different systems, such as their ability to 
contain costs or their efficiency.  
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Table 9  Generational Accounts under Various Labor Productivity Growth Rates 
(in % of GDP per capita) 
Discount rate  4.0  5.0 (baseline)  6.0 
Productivity  growth  0.7 1.7 2.7 0.7 1.7 2.7 0.7 1.7 2.7 
Czech Republic  -78  -119  -207  -65  -80  -115  -62  -67  -80 
Denmark -78  -124  -226  -66  -83  -124  -63  -69  -85 
Estonia  -49  -91  -180 -38 -53 -89  -37 -41  -55 
France  -94  -164  -305  -77 -102 -157 -76  -83 -103 
Italy  -71  -88  -121 -65 -72 -87  -62 -65  -71 
Netherlands -82  -127  -225  -72  -87  -127  -70  -74  -89 
United  Kingdom  -64  -93  -149 -54 -66 -89  -50 -55  -65 
Average -74  -115  -202  -62  -78  -113  -60  -65  -78 
Note: Labor productivity growth and discount rate are in %. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Changes from net benefits to net payments slightly differ among countries. 
These differences stem from the time youths start participating in the labor market 
and their contributions from earned wages outweigh average public health care ex-
penditures. Although the age of 15 represents the lowest possible threshold, the real 
age of the representative agent varies in accordance with participation rates and 
the health care costs profile. In the Czech Republic and Denmark, net payment vis-à- 
-vis the public sector starts at the age of 24 years, while in Italy it starts at 17 years 
(the sample average is 21). The same situation is envisaged for exiting the labor force 
due to retirement. However, the dispersion of the age at which the representative agent 
becomes a  beneficiary is lower surrounding the  age of 62, with the  exception of 
the Czech Republic and Denmark again, where the sum of payments is lower than 
paid health expenditures at 64 years. 
The results are highly sensitive to the discount rate used. For the 4% discount 
rate, the average generational account equals 115% of GDP per capita. For the 6% 
discount rate, the size is reduced to 64.8% of GDP per capita. This result is a conse-
quence of the fact that an individual contributes to the system at working age and 
benefits from the system mostly at higher age. The more discounted are the future 
financial flows, the less important is the future drawing of benefits in old age. 
An analysis was also conducted of the  sensitivity of the  total generational 
accounts to various labor productivity growth rates (Table 9). Generally, we can con-
clude that the higher the labor productivity growth, and thus the growth of potential 
output as well, the higher the generational imbalances created. This observation has 
its roots in the evolution of expenditure (see Table 10 for different expenditure sce-
narios according to labor productivity growth), since health expenditure growth is 
driven by growth of GDP per capita (see equation 7). The constant revenue-to-GDP 
ratio does not compensate for the accumulation of health expenditures in terms of 
GDP. 
Within the  5% baseline discount rate, the  generational accounts deficit for 
a 2007 newborn would be 45% larger on average if labor productivity increased by 
1 p.p. more. Conversely, if labor productivity grew by 0.7% annually, the accounts 
deficit would shrink to 81% of the size of the baseline scenario. Again, the relation of 
higher discount rates is valid, while at 6% discount rate the differences from the base-
line productivity growth are nearly half. 396                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 5 
 
Table 10  Expenditures and Deficits under Various Labor Productivity Growth 
Scenarios (in % of GDP) 
   Expenditures  Deficits 
Year 2060  2107  2060  2107 
Productivity  growth  0.7 1.7 2.7 0.7 1.7 2.7 0.7 1.7 2.7 0.7 1.7 2.7 
Czech  Republic  7.0 7.2 7.3 7.2 7.5 7.7 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.4 
Denmark  8.6 8.8 9.0 8.9 9.1 9.5 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.8 
Estonia  5.7 5.8 5.9 5.9 6.1 6.2 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.9 1.1 
France  9.8  10.0  10.1  10.0  10.4  10.6 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.6 1.8 
Italy  7.7 7.8 7.9 7.9 8.1 8.3 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 
Netherlands  8.5 8.7 8.8 8.7 9.0 9.3 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.4 1.7 
United  Kingdom  8.0 8.1 8.2 8.2 8.4 8.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4 
Average  7.9 8.1 8.2 8.1 8.4 8.6 0.8 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 
Note: Labor productivity growth is in %. 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Regarding the differences in the size of deficits in public health care systems under 
the  different productivity scenarios, our analysis indicates that the  changes 
would range from 0.1 p.p. of GDP to –0.3 p.p. in 2060 and from 0.2 p.p. to –0.4 p.p. 
in 2107 relative to the baseline. 
4. Conclusion 
Growing demand for health care – stemming from growing expectations of 
society concerning health care – coupled with medical advances thanks to technologi-
cal progress has been observed for decades in the OECD countries. Moreover, ac-
cording to all available demographic projections, population ageing as a long-term 
process seems to be inevitable in the European economies in the coming years. 
The main subject of this paper has been to study the implications of population ageing 
for the financing of health care, with a special focus on intergenerational solidarity. 
Under the assumption of a constant capital-labor ratio, supporting the hypothesis of 
a constant tax-to-GDP ratio in the future, growing health expenditures imply notice-
able fiscal imbalances. The notional deficit necessary to cover health care expendi-
ture in 2100, if demand for health care is to be satisfied, varies from 0.9 to 1.5 p.p. of 
GDP in the baseline productivity growth scenario in the countries analyzed. 
Having built a  macroeconomic long-term projection model, we computed 
the  notional generational accounts in health care, which characterize the  size of 
the burden generated by a newborn in 2007 during his life in health care in seven 
selected countries representing different cultural and institutional settings of health 
care financing systems. According to the model, significant burdens on future gen-
erations – ranging from 53% to 102% of GDP per capita under a 5% discount rate – 
are generated by the current generations. The highest burden was found in France, 
where most of the resources are raised from the working population and where health 
expenditure is high in the initial year of the projection, and lowest burden was found 
in Estonia due to its extremely low current health expenditure.  
All else equal, the  systems financed by social health insurance or income 
taxes generate higher burdens on future generations. (Note: if the retirement age as-
sumption is relaxed in such a way that the retirement age grows more or less in line 
with life expectancy, the evolution of the labor force will moderate the impact on Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 60, 2010, no. 5                                     397 
direct-tax-financed health systems.) The  effect is more pronounced the  lower is 
the discount rate. This observation stems from the fact that systems based on social 
health insurance generate a less equal lifetime distribution of net taxes than systems 
financed to a large extent from consumption taxes paid by all individuals. 
However, as we are dealing with health care, we have to bear in mind that 
all predicted deficits and burdens generated by the representative agents, unlike in 
the case of pensions, are subject to the condition that the demand for health care is 
satisfied, which in reality need not be true. The policy implication we can draw from 
our analysis is that more resources will be needed to cover the growing health ex-
penditure if society does not agree to the rationing of health care. On the other hand, 
if society decides not to spend more on health care, adequate measures should be 
taken to ensure that health care is available for individuals with serious conditions. 
Such measures could include support for prevention, which could save scarce re-
sources in the future, and institutional changes aimed at improving the efficiency of 
health care systems. 
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